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PREFACE
The G-24 Discussion Paper Series is a collection of research papers prepared
under the UNCTAD Project of Technical Support to the Intergovernmental Group of
Twenty-Four on International Monetary Affairs and Development (G-24). The G-24
was established in 1971 with a view to increasing the analytical capacity and the
negotiating strength of the developing countries in discussions and negotiations in the
international financial institutions. The G-24 is the only formal developing-country
grouping within the IMF and the World Bank. Its meetings are open to all developing
countries.
The G-24 Project, which is administered by UNCTAD￿s Division on Globalization
and Development Strategies, aims at enhancing the understanding of policy makers in
developing countries of the complex issues in the international monetary and financial
system, and at raising awareness outside developing countries of the need to introduce
a development dimension into the discussion of international financial and institutional
reform.
The research papers are discussed among experts and policy makers at the meetings
of the G-24 Technical Group, and provide inputs to the meetings of the G-24 Ministers
and Deputies in their preparations for negotiations and discussions in the framework of
the IMF￿s International Monetary and Financial Committee (formerly Interim Committee)
and the Joint IMF/IBRD Development Committee, as well as in other forums.
The Project of Technical Support to the G-24 receives generous financial support
from the International Development Research Centre of Canada and contributions from
the countries participating in the meetings of the G-24.REFORMING THE IMF:
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Abstract
A genuine reform of the IMF would require as much a redirection of its activities
as improvements in its policies and operational modalities. There is no sound
rationale for the Fund to be involved in development and trade policy, or in bailout
operations in emerging market crises. It should focus on short-term counter-cyclical
current account financing and policy surveillance. To be effective in crisis prevention
it should help emerging markets to manage unsustainable capital inflows by
promoting appropriate measures, including direct and indirect controls. It should
also pay greater attention to destabilizing impulses originating from macro-
economic and financial policies in major industrial countries. Any reform designed
to bring greater legitimacy would need to address shortcomings in its governance
structure, but the Fund is unlikely to become a genuinely multilateral institution
with equal rights and obligations for all its members, de facto as well as de jure,
unless it ceases to depend on a few countries for resources and there is a clear
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There have been widespread misgivings about
international economic cooperation in recent years
even as the need for global collective action has
grown because of recurrent financial crises in emerg-
ing markets, the increased gap between the rich and
the poor, and the persistence of extreme poverty in
many countries in the developing world. Perhaps
more than any other international organization the
IMF has been the focus of these misgivings. Several
observers including former Treasury Secretaries of
the United States, a Nobel Prize economist and many
NGOs have called for its abolition on grounds that
it is no longer needed, or that its interventions in
emerging market crises are not only wasteful but also
harmful for international economic stability, or that
its programmes in the third world serve to aggra-
vate rather than alleviate poverty.1 Others want the
IMF to be merged into the World Bank because they
see them as doing pretty much the same thing with
the same clientele.2 Many who still wish to keep the
Fund as an independent institution with a distinct
mission call for reform of both what it has been do-
ing and how it has been doing it.3 All these groups
include individuals across a wide spectrum of po-
litical opinion, ranging from conservative free
marketers to anti-globalizers.
The principal rationale for global collective
action in financial matters and for institutions needed
to facilitate such action is market failure. More spe-
cifically, international financial markets fail to
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The best reformers the world has ever seen
are those who commence on themselves.
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provide adequate liquidity and development financ-
ing for a large number of countries, and they are the
main source of global economic instability. These
have repercussions not only for the countries directly
concerned but also for the international community
as a whole because of the existence of international
externalities. Furthermore, due to cross-border inter-
dependence, pursuit of national interests by individual
countries in macroeconomic and financial policies
can result in negative global externalities, and pre-
venting conflicts and collective damage calls for a
certain degree of multilateral discipline over national
policy making as well as economic cooperation.4
Such concerns in fact provided the original ra-
tionale for the creation of the IMF and the World
Bank with a clear division of labour between the
two. However, these institutions have gone through
considerable transformation in response to changes
that have taken place in the world economic and
political landscape in the past sixty years. In particu-
lar, the Fund is no longer performing the functions it
was originally designed for; namely, securing mul-
tilateral discipline in exchange rate policies and
providing liquidity for current account financing.
Rather, it has been focusing on development finance
and policy and poverty alleviation in poor countries,
and the management and resolution of capital ac-
count crises in emerging markets.
This paper argues that there is no sound ration-
ale for the Fund to be involved in development
matters, including long-term lending. This is also
true for several areas of policy closely connected to
development, most notably trade policy which is a
matter for multilateral negotiations elsewhere in the
global system. On the other hand, while the manage-
ment and resolution of financial crises in emerging
markets constitute a key area of interest to the Fund
in the context of its broader objective of securing
international monetary and financial stability, there
is little rationale for financial bailout operations that
have so far been the main instrument of the Fund￿s
interventions in such crises. The original considera-
tions that precluded IMF lending to finance capital
outflows continue to be equally valid today since
such operations do not correct but aggravate market
failures. There are other institutions and mechanisms
that can serve better the objectives that may be sought
by such lending. By contrast the Fund should pay
much greater attention to two areas in which its exist-
ence carries a stronger rationale; namely, short-term,
counter-cyclical current account financing, and ef-
fective surveillance over national macroeconomic
and financial policies, particularly of countries which
have a disproportionately large impact on interna-
tional monetary and financial stability. In other
words, a genuine reform of the Fund would require
as much a redirection of its activities as improve-
ments in its policies and operational modalities.
However, none of these would be possible without
addressing shortcomings in its governance structure.
The purpose of this paper is not to provide a
blueprint for the reform of the Fund, but to discuss
and elaborate a number of broad issues that would
need to be taken into account in any serious attempt
to make the Fund a genuinely multilateral institu-
tion with equal rights and obligations for all its
members, in practice as well as in theory. The next
section will give a brief description of the original
rationale for the Fund, its evolution in the past sixty
years and current focus. This is followed by a dis-
cussion of what the Fund is but should not be doing;
that is, development policy and financing, and trade
policy. Section E makes a critical assessment of the
Fund￿s role in crisis management and resolution
while section F turns to issues related to the reform
of its lending policy and resources. This is followed
by a section on the Fund￿s surveillance function.
Section H focuses on governance issues, notably the
prerequisites for a genuinely symmetrical and mul-
tilateral financial institution. The paper ends with a
summary of the main proposals.
B.The original rationale and the
postwar evolution of the IMF
The main objective pursued by the architects
of the postwar economic system with the creation
of the IMF was to avoid the recurrence of a number
of difficulties that had led to the breakdown of in-
ternational trade and payments in the interwar pe-
riod. These difficulties arose in large part because
of lack of multilateral arrangements to facilitate an
orderly payments adjustment in countries facing
large external debt and deficits. Under conditions of
excessively volatile short-term capital flows and in
the absence of any obligation on the side of the sur-
plus countries to share the burden of adjustment,
deficit countries had been forced to undertake de-
flationary measures, or resort to trade and exchange
restrictions and competitive devaluations in order to3 Reforming the IMF: Back to the Drawing Board
protect economic activity and employment, thereby
generating negative externalities and frictions in
international economic relations.
Arrangements for multilateral discipline over
exchange rate policies, provision of adequate inter-
national liquidity, and restrictions over destabilizing
capital flows were thus seen as essential for interna-
tional monetary stability and prevention of tensions
and disruptions in international trade and payments.
The IMF was designed to ensure an orderly system
of international payments at stable but multilater-
ally negotiated, adjustable exchange rates under
conditions of strictly limited international capital
flows. A key task of the Fund was to provide inter-
national liquidity in order to avoid deflationary and
destabilizing adjustments and trade and exchange
restrictions in countries facing temporary balance
of payments deficits. Although the responsibility for
addressing the problems associated with fluctuations
in export earnings of developing countries effectively
fell under the IMF￿s role for the provision of liquid-
ity, the Fund was created primarily for securing the
stability of external payments and exchange rates of
the major industrial countries, rather than for the
stabilization of balance of payments of developing
countries.
There was a certain degree of creative ambiguity
in the way the Fund￿s Articles were drafted in order
to reach consensus. This was the case for exchange
rate arrangements which sought to reconcile multi-
lateral discipline with national autonomy. Countries
undertook obligations to maintain their exchange
rates within a narrow range of their par values and
were allowed to change their par values under fun-
damental disequilibrium, but the latter was never
defined in the Articles of Agreement. An unauthor-
ized change in par value was not a violation of the
Articles, but would enable the Fund to withhold the
member￿s access to its resources and even to force
the member to withdraw (Dam, 1982: 90￿93).
This was also the case with arrangements re-
garding the modalities for the provision of liquidity,
one of the most controversial issues during the ne-
gotiations. Keynes strongly argued that members
should have unconditional access to the Fund within
the limits of their quotas and that ￿it would be very
unwise to try to make an untried institution too grand-
motherly￿ (IMF, 1969, Vol. 1: 72). However, the
United States resisted unconditional drawings on
grounds that it would be the only source of net credit
in the immediate postwar era since the dollar was
then the only convertible currency. The compromise
agreed to in Article V entitling members ￿to pur-
chase the currencies of other members from the
Fund￿, together with the absence of the language of
credit from the Articles, had the connotation that
members would have the right to determine how
much they would draw within the limits of their quo-
tas, treating their subscriptions as their own reserves
(Dam, 1982: 106; and Dell, 1981: 4￿5). Most coun-
tries believed that this formulation gave members
unconditional drawing rights, though there was con-
siderable room for other interpretation.
Access to the Fund was restricted to current
account financing. The Fund was prohibited to lend
to meet sustained outflow of capital and empowered
to compel a member to exercise capital controls as a
condition for access to its resources. In effect, these
arrangements discouraged reliance on private flows
for balance of payment financing. During the nego-
tiations for the Bank there was considerable debate
on whether the task could be effectively performed
by private lenders, but this was not the case for IMF
financing. Although there were some instances of
currency stabilization in interwar years supported
by officially arranged private lending (Oliver, 1975:
12￿15), it was almost taken for granted that com-
mercial banks could not be relied on for such a task,
particularly given the high degree of volatility of
short-term capital flows during interwar years and
pro-cyclical behaviour of private lending.
The members￿ contributions to the Fund, their
drawing rights and voting rights were all linked to a
single concept of quotas, determined through a
highly politicized exercise so as to give an effective
veto power to the United States over key decisions.5
This has been an important factor in the evolution
of the Fund over subsequent years, particularly with
respect to conditions governing the members￿ draw-
ings and the operational procedures followed.6
The process of legitimizing and ratcheting
conditionality started soon after the Bretton Woods
Conference. A key decision in 1952 formally adopted
conditionality and introduced standby arrangements
as the central operational modality (IMF, 1969,
Vol. 3: 228￿230). This was followed by a 1956 de-
cision on the phased drawings in order to better
enforce conditionality with loans disbursed in
tranches, contingent on satisfactory achievement of
agreed targets, and proliferation of performance cri-4 G-24 Discussion Paper Series, No. 38
teria.7 Although the Board decided in 1968 to limit
the number of performance criteria after developing
countries argued that the minimum conditionality
applied to the drawing by the United Kingdom in
1967 should become the norm, in practice there was
no easing of conditionality, particularly after it was
given legal sanction in 1969 through an amendment
of the Articles.8
As a result of these changes, automatic draw-
ing has been confined to the reserve tranche with
higher tranches bringing tighter conditionality. Thus,
the Fund has moved away from provision of liquid-
ity, that is, finance available on short notice and
virtually unconditionally, towards finance supplied
on the basis of negotiated conditions and made avail-
able through successive tranches.9 And since the IMF
quotas have considerably lagged behind the growth
of world trade, countries￿ access to balance of pay-
ments financing has come increasingly under IMF
policy oversight.
But perhaps one of the biggest divergences from
the Bretton Woods objectives has been in the con-
tent of conditionality rather than the principle.
Through conditionality the Fund has effectively
sought to impose exactly the kind of policies that
the postwar planners wanted to avoid in countries
facing payments difficulties ￿ austerity and de-
stabilizing currency adjustments. Austerity has been
promoted not only when balance of payments diffi-
culties were due to excessive domestic spending or
distortions in the price structure, but also when they
resulted from external disturbances such as adverse
terms of trade movements, hikes in international in-
terest rates or trade measures introduced by another
country. Furthermore, the distinction between tem-
porary and structural disequilibria has become
blurred, often implying that a developing country
should interpret every positive shock as temporary
and thus refrain from using it as an opportunity for
expansion, and every negative shock as permanent,
thus adjusting to it by cutting growth and/or altering
the domestic price structure.
The evolution of IMF conditionality has been
shaped by shifts in economic and political condi-
tions and interests of its major shareholders. Initially
the United States had insisted on some form of
conditionality to stem excessive reliance on dollar
credits. Subsequently, it used conditionality to pur-
sue its national interests. Europe, notably the United
Kingdom, initially resisted conditionality because of
its need to draw on the Fund￿s resources. Subse-
quently, when they no longer relied on the Fund,
conditionality ceased to be a problem for the Euro-
pean countries, including for the smaller ones which
took refuge in the European Monetary System, losing
monetary autonomy vis-￿-vis Germany but gaining
considerable protection from Fund conditionality.10
A major transformation of the Fund took place
with the breakdown of the Bretton Woods exchange
rate system brought about in large part by inconsist-
encies of policies among major industrial countries
and rapid growth of international financial markets
and capital movements. While floating was adopted
with the understanding that its stability depended
upon orderly underlying conditions, the obligations
undertaken by countries were, as pointed out by
Triffin (1976: 47￿48), ￿so general and obvious as to
appear rather superfluous￿ and the system ￿essen-
tially proposed to legalize ￿ the widespread and
illegal repudiation of Bretton Woods commitments,
without putting any other binding commitments in
their place.￿ This in effect meant that currency sta-
bility ceased to be a key objective of international
economic cooperation. It also meant that there would
no longer be any mechanism to ensure effective
multilateral discipline over the policies of non-bor-
rowing members of the IMF.
In its operations in developing countries the
focus of the Fund was initially on short-term cur-
rent account financing. The Compensatory Financing
Facility (CFF) introduced in the early 1960s as a
result of a UN initiative enabled countries facing
temporary shortfalls in primary export earnings to
draw on the Fund beyond their normal drawing rights
without the performance criteria normally required
for upper credit tranches (Dam, 1982: 127￿128).
However, automaticity was effectively removed by
a subsequent decision of the Fund (Dell, 1985: 245),
and the ￿reforms￿ introduced in 2000 tightened fur-
ther the circumstances for unconditional access to
CFF (IMF, 2004b: 10).
A number of other similar ad hoc facilities have
also been discontinued, including the buffer stock
financing facility introduced in the late 1960s. This
is also true for the two oil facilities of the 1970s
which constituted exceptional steps in IMF lending
practices as they had been introduced as deliberate
countercyclical devices to prevent oil price hikes
from triggering a global recession.11 They also allowed
the kind of automaticity of drawings advocated by5 Reforming the IMF: Back to the Drawing Board
Keynes during the Bretton Woods negotiations (Dell,
1986: 1207).
The breakdown of the Bretton Woods exchange
rate system together with the graduation of the Eu-
ropean countries from the Fund pushed it closer to
development issues. In this respect the creation of
the Extended Fund Facility (EFF) in 1974 marks a
turning point. It was established as a non-concessional
lending facility to address persistent and structural
balance of payments problems.12 This was followed
by the Structural Adjustment Facility and the En-
hanced Structural Adjustment Facility, which
provided concessional lending to low-income coun-
tries for structural change. As a result of increased
emphasis on poverty reduction, the latter was re-
placed in 1999 by a Poverty Reduction and Growth
Facility (PRGF), a concessional window for low-
income countries.
In perhaps an even more important shift, the
Fund has become a crisis lender and manager for
emerging markets. This role effectively started with
the outbreak of the debt crisis in the 1980s when
many developing countries borrowed heavily from
multilateral sources to finance debt servicing to pri-
vate creditors (Sachs, 1998: 53). And with the
recurrent financial crises in emerging markets in the
1990s, crisis lending has become the dominant fi-
nancial activity of the Fund. The Supplemental
Reserve Facility (SRF) was created in response to
the deepening of the East Asian crisis in December
1997 in order to provide financing above normal
access limits to countries experiencing exceptional
payments difficulties, notably in servicing their ex-
ternal debt to private creditors and maintaining
capital account convertibility, under a highly condi-
tional standby or Extended Arrangement.
Thus sixty years after its inception, the IMF is
now quite a different institution from the one cre-
ated by the architects of the postwar international
economic system. It ￿has adjusted to the changing
economic conditions by sponsoring amendments to
its Charter, by liberal interpretations of the Charter￿s
provisions, and in some cases by ignoring limita-
tions imposed by the Charter.￿13 It is now deeply
involved in development issues, providing long-term
financing on concessional terms as well as assist-
ance on HIPC: currently the number of low-income
countries which are covered under financial arrange-
ments for PRGF and HIPC assistance exceeds the
number of countries with standby arrangements by
a factor of four (IMF, 2005a). It started out as an
institution designed to promote global growth and
stability through multilateral discipline over ex-
change rate policies, control over capital flows and
provision of liquidity for current account financing.
It has ended up focusing on the management and
resolution of capital-account crises in emerging
markets associated with excessive instability of capi-
tal flows and exchange rates, allocating a large
proportion of its lending for financing capital out-
flows: during the financial year ended 30 April 2004,
over 85 per cent of total purchases and loans were
accounted for by crisis lending to Argentina, Brazil
and Turkey (IMF, 2004a, table II.6). More impor-
tantly, originally all members of the Fund had equal
de jure and de facto obligations for maintaining sta-
ble exchange rates and orderly macroeconomic
conditions. With the breakdown of the Bretton
Woods exchange rate arrangements, the establish-
ment of universal convertibility of the currencies of
major industrial countries, and the emergence of in-
ternational financial markets as a main source of
liquidity for advanced economies, the Fund￿s policy
oversight has been confined primarily to its poorest
members who need to draw on its resources because
of their lack of access to private sources of finance.
C.Mission creep into development
finance and policy
Much of the recent debate on the role of the
IMF in development has focused on three issues.
First, there has been widespread criticism of rapid
deregulation and liberalization promoted by the Fund
in developing countries because of their adverse re-
percussions for economic growth and poverty.
Second, the conditions attached to Fund lending have
been under constant fire on grounds that, inter alia,
they interfere with the proper jurisdiction of a sover-
eign government and leave little room for manoeuvre
to national policy makers. Finally, there is a broad
consensus that financing provided in support of such
programmes, including in the form of debt relief, is
highly inadequate.
There has been less emphasis on whether
the Fund should really be involved in development
finance and policy, and poverty alleviation, particu-
larly given that there are other multilateral institu-
tions exclusively focusing on these issues, including6 G-24 Discussion Paper Series, No. 38
multilateral development banks and various UN tech-
nical assistance agencies. Nevertheless, there are
some notable exceptions. For instance the Meltzer
Commission (2000) unanimously recommended that
the IMF should restrict its financing to provision of
liquidity, and stop lending to countries for long-term
development assistance and structural transforma-
tion. Accordingly, the PRGF should be eliminated
and long-term institutional assistance to foster de-
velopment and encourage sound economic policies
should be the exclusive responsibility of the World
Bank and regional development banks. Similarly,
according to the former World Bank chief econo-
mist Joseph Stiglitz (2002: 232) ￿a broad consensus
￿ outside the IMF ￿ has developed that the IMF
should limit itself to its core area, managing crises;
that it should no longer be involved (outside crises)
in development or the economies of transition.￿
There are indeed no compelling reasons why
the IMF should deal with structural problems in de-
veloping countries. As noted, the Fund moved
towards developing countries in large part because
it was no longer needed by industrial countries as a
source of liquidity and it lost leverage over exchange
rate and macroeconomic polices of these countries.
Sticking to its original mandate for facilitating pay-
ments adjustment through provision of liquidity to
meet temporary current account deficits would not
have generated much business for the Fund in devel-
oping countries given that their balance of payments
difficulties were structural and durable, rather than
cyclical and temporary. This, together with the ex-
pansion of IMF membership in Africa, was the main
reason why the Fund introduced long-term facilities
and concessional lending. In doing so, however, it
has gone right into the domain of development since
overcoming structural payments deficits calls for
reducing both savings and foreign exchange gaps,
including chronic public sector deficits, which, in
turn, depends on structural and institutional changes
and economic growth, rather than demand manage-
ment. But these are exactly the kind of issues dealt
with by multilateral development banks, and involve
action in wide areas of policy including agriculture,
industry, trade, investment, technology, finance, the
labour market and the public sector.14
That external disequilibrium in developing
countries is structural does not justify the Fund go-
ing into long-term balance of payments support
because this is exactly what the World Bank has been
doing since the early 1980s when it shifted its lend-
ing from project financing to structural adjustment
and development policy loans which now constitute
about half of total Bank lending. Furthermore, the
Bank is doing this for all developing countries while
such long-term balance of payments support in the
Fund is limited to low-income countries eligible to
PRGF. This is an ad hoc arrangement without a sound
rationale, since there are many middle-income coun-
tries with chronic payments deficits and excessive
dependence on foreign capital, notably in Latin
America, in need of long-term support to strengthen
domestic savings and export capacity. This incon-
sistency should be addressed not by bringing them
under the IMF, but taking the others out to the Bank.
As part of its work on development and poverty
alleviation, the Fund￿s programmes and structural
conditionality have addressed almost all areas of
development policy. This is problematic for several
reasons. First of all it is not clear that the Fund has
the necessary competence and experience in such
complex issues. Certainly, the kind of expertise in
development policy resulting from research and prac-
tical experience, and access to a significant amount
of information on institutions and policy environment
expected from the Bank do not define the existing
capabilities of the Fund.15 Nor are they needed for
the Fund to function effectively in its areas of core
competence. Furthermore, there are serious risks in
entrusting development matters to an organization
preoccupied with short-term financial outcomes and
susceptible to strong influences from sudden shifts
in market sentiments about the economies of its bor-
rowers. Finally, there is no doubt that what the IMF
does or should be doing for promoting monetary and
financial stability has consequences for poverty and
development, but this does not provide a rationale
for the Fund to work in these areas. Such inter-
dependencies exist in many areas of policy affecting
poverty and development, including trade, labour,
health, environment and security, both at the national
and international level. What is needed is close co-
operation and coordination with the institutions
specialized in these matters with a view to attaining
coherence and consistency, not duplication.
The Bank and the Fund have taken great pains
to show that they are closely coordinating in order
to minimize overlap and duplication (IMF/WB,
2004), but in reality much of what is being done in
development by the Fund could easily be transferred
to the Bank. This overlap has in fact given rise to
calls to merge the Fund with the World Bank, in-7 Reforming the IMF: Back to the Drawing Board
cluding by George Shultz (1998), former Secretary
of the Treasury and Secretary of State of the United
States, arguing that their activities are becoming
increasingly duplicative even though basically
uncoordinated.16 More recently a former German Ex-
ecutive Director for the World Bank Group and
Executive Secretary of the Development Commit-
tee (Fischer, 2004) argued that while complete fusion
of the BWIs under a new charter would be the opti-
mal solution, politically and practically a more
feasible step would be to combine the administra-
tion and the boards of the two institutions, and to
reshape the single board in such a way as to give
greater voice to developing countries. This would
reduce extensive duplication at the administrative
level, bring greater consistency in policy advice and
alleviate the pressure on poor countries with limited
administrative capacities in coordinating measures
promoted by the Fund and the Bank in overlapping
areas of policy. According to one estimate a com-
bined administration with a single board would reduce
the personnel and other costs in the administrative
budget by at least 25 per cent (Burnham, 1999) ￿
costs which are now effectively paid by debtor de-
veloping countries through charges and commission.
While it is often argued that the Fund and the
Bank should be merged because they are effectively
doing the same thing, what is argued here is that
they should remain separate institutions doing dif-
ferent things. In fact there are many areas in which
their activities do not and should not overlap. Crisis
management and resolution, surveillance over macro-
economic and exchange rate policies, and provision
of international liquidity are areas where the Fund
should have a distinct role and competence. By con-
trast, the Fund should transfer development-related
activities and facilities to the Bank. This would not
lead to a significant retrenchment of Fund lending;
at the end of 2004 outstanding PRGF credits were
less than SDR 7,000 billion or 10 per cent of total
outstanding credits (IMF, 2004a, table II.8). Nor
would it entail a major expansion in outstanding IDA
credits which currently are around $90 billion. The
legal difficulties that might be involved in trans-
ferring the resources currently located in the Fund
could be overcome once the principle is accepted
(Ahluwalia, 1999: 22).
In a recent statement the Managing Director
has argued in favour of deepening the Fund￿s work
on low-income countries and expressed his disagree-
ment with the view that the ￿Fund ought to get out
of the business of supporting low-income countries￿
on grounds that they ￿need macroeconomic policy
advice from the Fund and they often need financial
support from us￿ (De Rato, 2005: 4). However, the
issue is not about whether or not the Fund should be
involved in policy design in and provision of finance
to low-income countries, but the context in which
such activities should be undertaken. As discussed
in subsequent sections, a major task of the Fund
should be to provide counter-cyclical current account
financing to low-income countries facing excessive
instability in export earnings. Again, macroeconomic
conditions that may need to be attached to short-
term lending and Article IV consultations would give
the Fund ample opportunity to provide macroeco-
nomic policy advice to low-income countries. None
of these would require the Fund to be involved in
development matters.
D.Trespassing in trade policy
The Fund, as a monetary institution, was not to
be involved in trade issues even though its Articles,
in effect, authorized, through the scarce currency
clause, trade measures against surplus countries un-
willing to undertake expansionary measures by
allowing discriminatory exchange restrictions (Dam,
1982: 233). In the event, however, the Fund has gone
in the opposite direction, putting pressure on deficit
developing countries to undertake payments adjust-
ment despite mounting protectionism in industrial
countries against their exports, forcing them to re-
sort to import compression and sacrifice growth
(Aky￿z and Dell, 1987: 54). More importantly, as
the Fund became deeply involved in development
issues, it increasingly saw trade liberalization as an
important component of structural adjustment to
trade imbalances. As noted in a report by a group of
independent experts, IMF surveillance has expanded
into trade liberalization, partly as a result of pres-
sure from the United States as part of conditions for
its agreement to quota increases (IMF/GIE, 1999:
61). Trade liberalization has also been promoted in
certain emerging market economies in response to
surges in capital inflows as a way of absorbing ex-
cess reserves and preventing currency appreciation
(IMF/IEO, 2005: 8￿9 and 59, table 3.2).
Although greater openness to foreign competi-
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programmes supported by the Bank, the Fund is
known to have played a more important role in this
area. Low-income countries and LDCs working un-
der Fund programmes have been encouraged and
even compelled to undertake unilateral trade liberali-
zation, putting them at a disadvantage in multilateral
trade negotiations. Indeed the consequences of uni-
lateral trade liberalization by developing countries
outside the WTO framework are often discussed in
relation to Fund programmes (see e.g. WTO, 2004a,
section II.A).
An implication of unilateral liberalization is that
the industrial countries would not need to lower their
tariffs in areas of export interest to developing coun-
tries in order to secure better access to the markets
of these countries in the WTO where trade conces-
sions are based on some form of reciprocity.
Liberalization without improved market access in
the North creates the risk of deterioration in their
trade balances, hence leading either to a tighter ex-
ternal constraint and income losses, or to increased
external debt. Indeed there is an asymmetry in the
multilateral consequences of trade policy actions
taken by developing countries in the context of Fund-
supported programmes. A country liberalizing
unilaterally acquires no automatic rights in the WTO
vis-￿-vis other countries, but it could become liable
if it needs to take measures in breach of its obliga-
tions in the WTO.17
Although this is generally recognized to be a
problem and discussed during the Uruguay Round,
no mechanism has so far been introduced in the WTO
for crediting developing countries for their unilat-
eral liberalization in the context of Fund-supported
programmes. Furthermore, arguments are advanced
that this should not affect the position of developing
countries regarding their obligations in the WTO
since what matters there is not applied but bound
tariffs. However, for a number of reasons, including
pressures from financial markets and major trading
partners, developing countries find it difficult to raise
their tariffs once they are lowered. More importantly,
applied tariffs are now providing a benchmark in
binding and reducing tariffs in the current negotia-
tions on industrial tariffs in the WTO. For instance,
paragraph 5 of annex B of the so-called July package
which provides a framework for these negotiations
based on proposals made by industrial countries takes
the applied rates as the basis for commencing re-
ductions for unbound tariffs in developing countries
(WTO, 2004b). It also proposes to give credit for
autonomous liberalization by developing countries
provided that the tariff lines were bound on an MFN
basis. However, it is not clear that a line-by-line com-
mitment is necessarily in the best interest of these
countries, or that the kind of unilateral liberaliza-
tion agreed under IMF pressure would be consistent
with their bargaining positions in multilateral nego-
tiations (Aky￿z, 2005b).
Despite the difficulties confronting developing
countries in trade negotiations, the Fund staff have
been advancing arguments in favour of unilateral
liberalization in these countries that go even beyond
the positions advocated by major developed coun-
tries in the current negotiations on industrial tariffs.
For instance a recent Fund paper argues that Afri-
ca￿s interest in the Doha Round would best be served
by its own liberalization, and that African countries,
including the LDCs, should bind and reduce all tar-
iffs, even though the July package exempts LDCs
from tariff reductions and recognizes the need for
less-than-full reciprocity.18 The First Deputy Manag-
ing Director of the IMF has encouraged developing
countries to undertake unilateral liberalization on
several occasions, arguing that ￿countries that press
ahead with unilateral liberalization will enjoy enor-
mous benefits and they will not be penalized by
further multilateral liberalization- quite the opposite.
Countries that open up unilaterally help themselves￿
(Krueger, 2005: 5). The Fund has recently introduced
a Trade Integration Mechanism to mitigate concerns
among some developing countries that their balance-
of-payments position could suffer as a result of
multilateral liberalization in the current round of
negotiations, insisting that such shortfalls would be
small and temporary (IMF, 2005b), despite mount-
ing evidence that rapid liberalization in poor
countries can raise imports much faster than exports
and that the external financing needed can add sig-
nificantly to the debt burden.19
The Fund staff have been advocating binding
tariffs closer to their applied levels on grounds that
this would increase trade by reducing uncertainty of
trade policy and hence transaction costs (see e.g.
Yang, 2005: 9). This may well be the case, but it is
not a matter that should be of primary concern to
the Fund. The international trading system no doubt
needs greater predictability and stability, but discre-
tion over tariffs by developing country governments
is not the most serious source of disruption. As the
recent experience regarding the movement of the
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and misalignments are an equal and even more im-
portant source of uncertainty and friction in the
international trading system. This was recognized
by the architects of the postwar international eco-
nomic system, including Lord Keynes: ￿Tariffs and
currency depreciations are in many alternatives.
Without currency agreements you have no firm
ground on which to discuss tariffs ... It is very diffi-
cult while you have monetary chaos to have order
of any kind in other directions.￿20 It is thus advis-
able for the Fund to focus on its core responsibility
of ensuring stability and better alignment of ex-
change rates, rather than narrowing the policy space
for developing countries in matters related to trade
and pushing trade liberalization as if a consistent
international monetary order existed.
As the Fund transfers its work on development
to the Bank, it should also stop being involved in
trade policy issues or undertake activities that inter-
fere with multilateral trade negotiations. Its relation
to the WTO should be confined to areas explicitly
stated in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
(GATT), notably in Article XV on exchange arrange-
ments. These include consultations and supplying
information on monetary reserves, balance of pay-
ments and foreign exchange arrangements in order
to help in matters such as the determination of
whether balance of payments and reserve conditions
of countries would entitle them to apply the provi-
sions of Articles XII and XVIIIB of GATT and
Article XII of GATS in order to avoid sacrificing
growth and development as a result of temporary
payments difficulties (see Das, 1999, chap. III.3; and
Aky￿z, 2002: 124￿125).
E.Crisis management and resolution:
bailouts or workouts?
There is a consensus that crises in emerging
markets will continue to occur because of financial
market failures as well as shortcomings in national
policies and international surveillance mechanisms.
There is also a wide agreement that the IMF should
be involved in the management and resolution of
such crises in order to limit the damage to the econo-
mies concerned, prevent contagion and reduce
systemic risks. However, there is considerable con-
troversy over how the Fund should intervene.
Until recently the Fund￿s intervention in finan-
cial crises in emerging markets involved ad hoc
financial bailout operations designed to keep coun-
tries current on their debt payments to private
creditors, to maintain capital account convertibility
and to prevent default. IMF rescue packages amounted
to several times the accepted quota limits (an an-
nual limit of 100 per cent of a member￿s quota and a
cumulative limit of 300 per cent), and were in certain
instances combined with funds from development
banks and bilateral contributions from major indus-
trial countries. IMF rescue packages for 6 emerging
markets (Mexico, Thailand, Indonesia, the Repub-
lic of Korea, the Russian Federation and Brazil)
between 1995 and 1998 reached $231 billion, of
which 44 per cent came from bilateral donors, 38 per
cent from the IMF, and the rest from development
banks (Ahluwalia, 1999: 55, table 1). From 1995
until the end of 2003 IMF exceptional financing for
9 emerging markets (the above six plus Argentina,
Turkey and Uruguay) amounted to SDR 174 billion,
with an average of 637 per cent of quota (IMF, 2005c,
table 10). Such lending is the main source of income
for the Fund to support its operational expenses,
which stood at some SDR 1.5 billion at the end of
FY2004. Thus, ironically, in the absence of finan-
cial crises and bailout operations in emerging
markets, the Fund can cease to be a financially vi-
able institution.
Crisis lending was combined with monetary and
fiscal tightening in order to restore confidence, but
this often failed to prevent sharp drops in the cur-
rency and hikes in interest rates, thereby deepening
debt deflation, credit crunch and economic contrac-
tion. Such interventions took place not only when
the country concerned was facing a liquidity prob-
lem, as in the Republic of Korea, but also when there
were signs of a problem of insolvency. Originally
rescue packages involved short-term, temporary fi-
nancing but more recently the Fund has provided
medium-term financing, including to governments
facing domestic debt problems such as in Turkey
(Aky￿z and Boratav, 2003).
In addition to the SRF noted above, the Con-
tingency Credit Line (CCL) was created in Spring
1999 in order to provide a precautionary line of de-
fence in the form of short-term financing which
would be available to meet future balance-of-pay-
ments problems arising from contagion.21 Countries
would pre-qualify for the CCL if they complied with
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financial indicators and with international standards
in areas such as transparency and banking supervision.
However, this facility discontinued in November 2003
as countries avoided recourse to it owing to fears
that it would give the wrong signal and impair their
access to financial markets.22
There have also been suggestions to turn the
Fund into an international lender of last resort with
a view to helping prevent crises (Fischer, 1999). It
is argued that if the IMF stands ready to provide
liquidity to countries with sound policies, they would
be protected from contagion and financial panic so
that a lender of last resort facility would have a pre-
ventive role. Clearly, such a step would involve a
fundamental departure from the underlying premises
of the Bretton Woods system. The report of the
Meltzer Commission (2000) virtually proposes the
elimination of all other forms of IMF lending, in-
cluding those for current account financing which
should, in their view, be provided by private mar-
kets.23 Such a shift in IMF lending would imply that
only a small number of more prosperous emerging
economies would be eligible for IMF financing
(Summers, 2000: 14). More importantly there are
difficulties in transforming the IMF into a genuine
international lender of last resort, and proposed ar-
rangements could compound rather than resolve
certain problems encountered in IMF bailouts.
The effective functioning of such a lender
would require discretion to create its own liquidity
in order to be able to provide an unlimited amount
of financing. This problem could, in principle, be
resolved by assigning a new role to the SDR, which
could also help promote it as a true fiduciary asset.24
Proposals have indeed been made to allow the Fund
to issue reversible SDRs to itself for use in lender-of-
last-resort operations, that is to say the allocated SDRs
would be repurchased when the crisis was over.25
However, the real problem relates to the terms
of access to such a facility. Genuine lender-of-last-
resort financing (namely lending in unlimited
amounts and without conditions except for penalty
rates) would need to be accompanied by tightened
global supervision of debtor countries to ensure their
solvency, and this would encounter not only techni-
cal but also political difficulties. Pre-qualification,
that is allowing countries meeting certain ex ante
conditions to be eligible to lender-of-last-resort fi-
nancing, as in the case of ill-fated CCL, involves
several problems. First, the IMF would have to act
like a credit-rating agency. Second, it would be nec-
essary to constantly monitor the fulfilment of the terms
of the financing to ensure that the pressures on the
capital account of a qualifying country have resulted
from a sudden loss of confidence amongst investors
triggered largely by external factors rather than mac-
roeconomic and financial mismanagement. In these
respects difficulties are likely to emerge in relations
between the Fund and the member concerned.
Perhaps the most serious problem with rescue
packages is that they tend to aggravate market failures
and financial instability by creating moral hazard.
This is more of a problem on the side of creditors
than debtors since access to lender of last resort fi-
nancing does not come free or prevent fully the
adverse repercussions of financial panics and runs
for debtor countries. The main difficulty is that bail-
outs undermine market discipline and encourage
imprudent lending since private creditors are not
made to bear the consequences of the risks they
take.26 A dose of constructive ambiguity by leaving
lender discretion might help in reducing moral haz-
ard, but at the expense of undermining the objective
sought by establishing such a facility.
There has been growing agreement that orderly
debt workout procedures drawing on certain princi-
ples of national bankruptcy laws, notably chapters 9
and 11 of the United States law provide a viable al-
ternative to official bailout operations.27 These should
be designed to meet two interrelated objectives. On
the one hand, they should help prevent financial
meltdown and economic crises in developing coun-
tries facing difficulties in servicing their external
obligations ￿ a situation which often results in a loss
of confidence of markets, collapse of currencies and
hikes in interest rates, inflicting serious damage on
both public and private balance sheets and leading
to large losses in output and employment and sharp
increases in poverty, all of these being part of actual
experience in East Asia, Latin America and else-
where during the past ten years. On the other hand,
they should provide mechanisms to facilitate an eq-
uitable restructuring of debt which can no longer be
serviced according to the original provisions of con-
tracts. Attaining these two objectives does not require
fully-fledged international bankruptcy procedures
but the application of a few key principles:28
￿A temporary debt standstill whether debt is
owed by public or private sector, and whether
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or liquidity problems ￿ a distinction which is
not always clear-cut. The decision for a stand-
still should be taken unilaterally by the debtor
country and sanctioned by an independent panel
rather than by the IMF because the countries
affected are among the shareholders of the Fund
which is itself also a creditor. This sanction
would provide an automatic stay on creditor
litigation. Such a procedure would be similar
to WTO safeguard provisions allowing coun-
tries to take emergency actions to suspend their
obligations when faced with balance-of-payments
difficulties (Aky￿z, 2002: 124￿125). Standstills
would need to be accompanied by exchange
controls, including suspension of convertibil-
ity for foreign currency deposits and other
foreign exchange assets domestically held by
residents.
￿Provision of debtor-in-possession financing
automatically granting seniority status to debt
contracted after the imposition of the standstill.
IMF should lend into arrears for financing
imports and other vital current account trans-
actions.
￿Debt restructuring including rollovers and
write-offs, based on negotiations between the
debtor and creditors, and facilitated by the in-
troduction of automatic rollover and collective
action clauses (CACs) in debt contracts. The
IMF should not be involved in the negotiations
between sovereign debtors and private creditors.
These principles still leave open several issues
of detail, but they nonetheless could serve as the basis
for a coherent and comprehensive approach to crisis
intervention and resolution. The Fund appeared to
be moving in this direction at the end of the last dec-
ade with rising opposition to bailout operations from
European and other governments and the increased
frequency of crises in emerging markets. The IMF
Board first recognized that ￿in extreme circum-
stances, if it is not possible to reach agreement on a
voluntary standstill, members may find it necessary,
as a last resort, to impose one unilaterally￿, and that
since ￿there could be a risk that this action would
trigger capital outflows ￿ a member would need to
consider whether it might be necessary to resort to
the introduction of more comprehensive exchange
or capital controls.￿29 Although the Board was un-
willing to provide statutory protection to debtors in
the form of a stay on litigation, preferring instead
￿signalling the Fund￿s acceptance of a standstill im-
posed by a member ￿ through a decision ￿ to lend
into arrears to private creditors￿, the Fund secretariat
moved towards establishing a formal mechanism for
sovereign debt restructuring to ￿allow a country to
come to the Fund and request a temporary standstill
on the repayment of its debts, during which time it
would negotiate a rescheduling with its creditors,
given the Fund￿s consent to that line of attack. Dur-
ing this limited period, probably some months in
duration, the country would have to provide assur-
ances to its creditors that money was not fleeing the
country, which would presumably mean the imposi-
tion of exchange controls for a temporary period of
time.￿ (Krueger, 2001: 7).
However, the provision for statutory protection
to debtors in the form of a stay on litigation is not
included in the proposal for Sovereign Debt Restruc-
turing Mechanism (SDRM) prepared by the Fund
management because of the opposition from finan-
cial markets and the United States government. The
proposed mechanism also provides considerable lev-
erage to creditors in seeking their permission in
granting seniority to new debt needed to prevent dis-
ruption to economic activity. It gives considerable
power to the Fund vis-￿-vis the proposed Sovereign
Debt Dispute Resolution Forum in determining debt
sustainability.30
The SDRM proposal contains innovative
mechanisms to facilitate sovereign bond restructur-
ing for countries whose debt is deemed unsustainable
in bringing debtors and bondholders together
whether or not bond contracts contain CACs, in se-
curing greater transparency, and in providing a
mechanism for dispute resolution. It could thus con-
stitute an important step in the move towards
generalized CACs in international bonds. However,
it only addresses part of the problem associated with
financial crises. First, it would not apply to coun-
tries with sustainable debt but facing liquidity
shortages. Secondly, it focuses exclusively on inter-
national bonds as a source of financial fragility even
though vulnerabilities associated with international
bank debt, currency risks assumed by the domestic
banking system, and public domestic debt played
key roles in most recent crises in emerging markets.
In the presence of such vulnerabilities bond clauses
alone cannot stem currency attacks or prevent finan-
cial turmoil. While the SDRM includes a provision
to discourage litigation by bondholders (through the
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rule cannot address the problem of how to stop fi-
nancial meltdown, since in a country whose debt is
judged unsustainable, currency runs could take place
whether or not bondholders opt for litigation.
More importantly, the SDRM proposal does not
fundamentally address the problems associated with
IMF bailouts. It is based on the premise that coun-
tries facing liquidity problems would continue to
receive IMF support and the SDRM will apply only
to those with unsustainable debt. As part of its pro-
motion of the SDRM the IMF has argued that
unsustainable debt situations are rare. That means
in most cases business as usual. In any case, it can
reasonably be expected that countries with unsus-
tainable debt would generally be unwilling to declare
themselves insolvent and activate the SDRM. In-
stead, they would be inclined to ask the Fund to
provide financing. But in most cases it would be dif-
ficult for the Fund to decline such requests on
grounds that the country is facing a solvency prob-
lem. Here lies the rationale for limits on IMF crisis
lending whether the problem is one of liquidity or
insolvency: with strict access limits creditors can-
not count on an IMF bailout, and debtors will be
less averse to activating the SDRM and standstills
when faced with serious difficulties in meeting their
external obligations and maintaining convertibility.
This means that to encourage countries to move
quickly to debt restructuring, the SDRM should be
combined with limits on crisis lending. But this could
be problematic unless private sector involvement is
secured through a statutory standstill and stay on liti-
gation.
Even this watered down version of the SDRM
proposal could not elicit adequate political support
and has, at the time of writing, been put on the
backburner. Indeed, the impetus for reform has gen-
erally been lost since the turn of the millennium
because of widespread complacency associated with
the recovery of capital flows to emerging markets.
This recovery has been driven by a combination of
highly favourable conditions including historically
low interest rates, high levels of liquidity, strong
commodity prices and buoyant international trade.
Private capital flows to emerging markets appear to
be in the boom phase of their third postwar cycle:
the first began in the 1970s and ended with the debt
crisis in the early 1980s, and the second began in
the early 1990s and ended with the East Asian and
Russian crises.31 Total inflows in the current boom
appear to have exceeded the peak observed in the
previous boom, and almost all emerging markets
have shared in this recovery. However, as noted by
the Institute of International Finance, the system is
becoming more fragile once again: ￿there is a risk
that the pickup in flows into some emerging market
assets has pushed valuations to levels that are not
commensurate with underlying fundamentals.￿ (IIF,
2005a: 4). Thus, a combination of tightened liquid-
ity, rising interest rates, slowing growth and global
trade imbalances can reverse the boom, hitting par-
ticularly countries with weak fundamentals and
incomplete self-insurance (IIF, 2005b; Goldstein,
2005b).32 Under these conditions if the recent con-
sensus against large-scale bailout operations is
adhered to, countries that may be facing rapid exit
of capital and unsustainable debt burdens could be
forced to undertake action for unilateral standstill,
creating considerable uncertainties and confusion in
the international financial system. If not, we will be
back to square one.
F.Restructuring IMF lending and
supplementing resources
The arguments developed above imply that the
Fund should return to its original mandate for the
provision of short-term current account financing and
should no longer be engaged in development finance
or financial bailout operations. This means abolish-
ing the facilities designed for these purposes includ-
ing the EFF, SRF and PRGF. Despite the rapid
development and integration of international bank-
ing and credit markets, there is still a strong rationale
for the Fund to have a role in providing liquidity
because of pro-cyclical behaviour of financial mar-
kets and increased volatility of global economic en-
vironment. Such financing should be made available
in order to support economic activity, employment
and trade when countries face sharp declines or
reversals of private capital flows, or temporary
shortfalls in external payments as a result of trade
shocks which cannot be met by private financing. In
both cases access to credit tranches through stand-
by agreements should be the main instrument for
the provision of liquidity. Greater delineation of
Bank-Fund activities requires that such financing
should be the sole responsibility of the Fund, and
the Bank should stay out of provision of short-term
finance.3313 Reforming the IMF: Back to the Drawing Board
While it has to be recognized that money is
fungible and in practice it is not always possible to
identify the need catered for by a particular loan, it
is important to ensure that IMF lending to counter
volatility in private capital flows should aim at main-
taining imports and the level of economic activity
rather than debt repayment to private creditors and
capital account convertibility. Such lending should
be available to countries facing cutback in credit lines
due to contagion as well as those facing currency
and debt crises. To ensure that such lending does
not amount to bailouts for private creditors, there
should be strict limits to IMF crisis lending since
otherwise it would be difficult to ensure private sec-
tor involvement.
This approach of constraining IMF lending to
encourage private sector involvement in the resolu-
tion of international financial crises has been
supported by some G-7 countries including Canada
and England.34 It has also been supported in a report
to the Council on Foreign Relations which argued
that the IMF should adhere consistently to normal
access limits and that only ￿in the unusual case in
which there appears to be a systemic crisis (that is a
multicountry crisis where failure to intervene threat-
ens the performance of the world economy and where
there is widespread failure in the ability of private
capital markets to distinguish creditworthy from less
creditworthy borrowers), the IMF would return to
its ￿systemic￿ backup facilities￿ (CFRTF, 1999: 63).
However, exceptions to normal access limits could
leave considerable room for large-scale bailout op-
erations and excessive IMF discretion in assessing
the conditions under which exceptional access in
capital account crises are to be granted.35 It would
also allow room for considerable political leverage
in IMF lending decisions by its major shareholders,
as was seen in the differential treatment of Argen-
tina and Turkey after the attacks of September 2001.
Requiring supermajority for access to exceptional
finance, as recommended by CFRTF (1999: 63) and
Goldstein (2005a: 299￿300) would certainly be an
important step, but it may not always prevent large
scale bailouts driven by political motivations. In any
case, the Fund should provide liquidity to countries
facing cutback in private lending in order to support
production, employment and trade, and should not
be expected to help float imprudent international
investors and lenders￿ a task that should fall on na-
tional authorities in creditor countries. On the other
hand, the problem of inadequacy of normal lending
limits for current account financing should be ad-
dressed by reforming quotas and access policy not
by making exceptions to access limits.
Exceptional current account financing may be
needed at times of a contraction in world trade and
growth, and/or sharp declines in capital flows to
developing countries, as was the case in the early
1980s and after the East Asian and Russian crises.
The Fund￿s regular resources may not be adequate
for dealing with such cases because they are not large
or flexible enough. This can be handled by a global
countercyclical facility based on reversible SDR al-
locations, which could be triggered by a decision of
the Board on the basis of certain predetermined cri-
teria regarding global trade and output and private
capital flows to developing countries. Again countries
could be permitted to have access to such a facility on
a temporary basis within predetermined limits.
Fund lending in response to trade shocks is
needed when financial markets are not willing to
provide counter-cyclical finance. As noted the CFF
was established in 1963 as an additional low-
conditionality facility to help developing countries
experiencing temporary shortfalls in export earnings
due to external shocks in order to avoid undue re-
trenchment. Modifications made over the years have
tightened conditions attached to the CFF, and the
facility has not been used since the last review in
2000 despite two recognized temporary shocks in-
cluding the attacks of September 2001 which affected
earnings from tourism in the Caribbean region (IMF,
2004b). A major problem is that in order to have
low conditionality financing under CFF (the so-
called stand alone CFF purchases) a country would
need to have a viable payments position except for
the effects of the shocks, but such a country would
normally have access to alternative sources of fi-
nance. On the other hand, countries with structurally
weak payments usually have other forms of high-
conditionality Fund financing including the PRGF
or emergency assistance (IMF, 2004b). Under cur-
rent arrangements the facility serves no useful purpose
and many Executive Directors called for its discon-
tinuation during the recent review, arguing that the
CFF is not an attractive option for low-income coun-
tries given its non-concessional nature (IMF, 2004c).
It is generally recognized that IMF quotas have
considerably lagged behind the growth of global
output and trade. According to one estimate, in 2000
they stood at 4 per cent of world imports compared
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ever, often argued that this does not imply that the
size of the Fund would need to be raised consider-
ably in order to keep up with growth in world trade
because closely integrated and rapidly expanding
financial markets now provide alternative sources
of liquidity, and the move to floating together with
the universal convertibility of several currencies have
reduced the need for international reserves. While
this may well be so for more advanced countries,
many developing countries continue to depend on
multilateral financing since market liquidity tends
to disappear at the time when it is most needed. These
countries are also more vulnerable to external shocks,
be it in trade or finance.
An across the board increase in the size of the
Fund may not address the problems faced by many
developing countries because of the small size of
their quotas. It is known that the current distribution
of quotas does not reflect the relative size of the
economies of the countries member to the IMF, and
a redistribution of quotas based on actual shares of
countries in aggregate world output would raise the
proportion of IMF quotas allocated to developing
countries, particularly if incomes are valued at pur-
chasing power parities (PPP) rather than market
exchange rates (Buira, 2003b). However, this would
only address a small part of the problem: according
to the IMF World Economic Outlook, the share of
advanced countries in aggregate GDP at PPP is close
to 58 per cent while their share in IMF quotas is just
over 60 per cent. For developing countries these
numbers stand at around 38 and 30 per cent respec-
tively. Moreover, a redistribution of quotas would
not produce a tangible increase in the share of low-
income developing countries which do not have
adequate access to international financial markets.
One way to tackle the problem would be to
adopt differential treatment of poorer countries in
the determination of their drawing rights. Under
existing arrangements quotas determine simultane-
ously countries￿ contributions to the Fund, voting
rights and drawing rights. But this is not the best
possible arrangement and the use of a single quota
to serve three purposes was rightly criticised as ￿both
illogical and unnecessary￿ (Mikesell, 1994: 37).
Putting a large wedge between countries￿ contribu-
tions and voting rights by subjecting them to totally
different rules may be problematic, but there is no
reason why drawing rights should not be based on
different quotas from contributions.36 After all non-
reciprocity between rights and obligations for poorer
countries has been an agreed principle in multilat-
eral arrangements in other spheres of economic
activity, notably trade, and such an approach would
also be consistent with concessionality applied to
lending to such countries by the Bretton Woods In-
stitutions. This may be arranged by setting different
access limits to different groups of countries accord-
ing to their vulnerability to external shocks and
access to financial markets, which in effect implies
that, under current arrangements, countries would
have different quotas for their contributions and
drawing rights. Income shares can be taken as the
basis for contributions while export earning volatil-
ity and access to private finance could be used as
criteria for determining drawing limits. Such a need-
based approach to access to IMF resources would
make even greater sense if, as proposed in section
H, the IMF ceases to be funded by its members, re-
lying instead on SDRs for the resources needed.
An overall expansion of Fund quotas, together
with its redistribution in favour of developing coun-
tries, would increase unconditional access through
reserve tranche purchases. However, automatic ac-
cess would also be expanded beyond the reserve
tranche for the poorer countries if quotas for draw-
ings are differentiated from those for contributions.
On the other hand, once the Fund stops dealing with
development and poverty, structural conditionality
should no longer be applied for access to upper credit
tranches. Conditionality would then be restricted to
fiscal, monetary and exchange rate policies ￿ the
Fund￿s core areas of competence.
Increased resources at the IMF should be ex-
pected to help strike a better balance between
financing and macroeconomic adjustment. In any
case, the kind of conditions to be attached to lend-
ing should depend on the nature of payment
imbalances. If the shortfall is due to temporary trade
and financial shocks, then it is important to ensure
that the Fund do not act pro-cyclically and impose
policy tightening. In such cases the balance between
policy adjustment and financing should be tilted to-
wards the latter. If expansionary macroeconomic
policies and excessive domestic absorption are at the
root of the problem, then financing would need to
be accompanied by realignment of monetary, fiscal
and exchange rate policies. However, if it turns out
that payments equilibrium can only be sustained at
permanently depressed rates of economic growth, this
is a matter that should be addressed by multilateral
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ment finance and promotion of structural policies,
including in areas affecting government revenues and
spending, rather than by IMF lending or macroeco-
nomic policy prescriptions for demand management.
An issue here is whether it would be possible
to distinguish between temporary and permanent
shocks or between structural and cyclical deficits
(see e.g. IMF, 2004b: 10). There are no doubt diffi-
culties in making judgment in these areas, which call
for prudence. However, such judgments are also
necessary under current arrangements in order to
strike a balance between adjustment and financing,
and between structural and macroeconomic condi-
tionality. Moreover, the Fund is engaged in making
judgments in areas that involve even higher degrees
of uncertainty such as debt sustainability and pros-
pects of the country regaining access to private
finance as part of the criteria to be met for excep-
tional access in capital account crises (IMF, 2005c: 4).
Placing macroeconomic and structural aspects of
payments adjustment in different institutions is no
more problematic than combining them under the
same roof. It would also have the additional advan-
tage of reducing the imbalance between adjustment
and financing since structural adjustment needs to
be supported by a lot more financing than macroeco-
nomic adjustment, and the IMF programmes tend to
rely heavily on macroeconomic tightening to reduce
payments imbalances even when they are structural
in nature.
G.Ineffectiveness and asymmetry of
Fund surveillance
The architects of the Bretton Woods system
recognized the role of surveillance over national
policies for international economic stability. But it
was only after the collapse of the fixed exchange
rate system and the expansion of capital markets that
IMF surveillance gained critical importance. With
the second amendment of the Articles of Agreement
the Fund was charged to exercise firm surveillance
over members￿ policies at the same time as mem-
bers were allowed the right to choose their own
exchange rate arrangements. Its objective, as for-
mally adopted, was limited to surveillance over
exchange rate policies, focusing primarily on the
sustainability of exchange rates and external pay-
ments positions, and on the appropriateness of the
associated economic policies, particularly monetary
and fiscal policies, of individual countries. However,
its scope and coverage have expanded over time into
structural policies, the financial sector and a number
of other areas (IMF/GIE, 1999: 21; Mohammed,
2000). The guidelines established in 1977 made an
explicit reference to the obligations of members to
avoid manipulating exchange rates or the interna-
tional monetary system to gain an unfair competitive
advantage over other members.37 In the 1980s the
major members of the Fund came to favour a broader
interpretation and recognized that ￿to be effective
surveillance over exchange rates must concern it-
self with the assessment of all the policies that affect
trade, capital movements, external adjustment, and
the effective functioning of the international mon-
etary system.￿38 After a series of emerging market
crises the Interim Committee agreed in April 1998
that the Fund ￿should intensify its surveillance of
financial sector issues and capital flows, giving par-
ticular attention to policy interdependence and risks
of contagion, and ensure that it is fully aware of
market views and perspectives.￿39 Various codes and
standards established on the basis of benchmarks
appropriate to major industrial countries for macr-
oeconomic policy, institutional and market structure,
and financial regulation and supervision have be-
come important components of the surveillance
process (Cornford, 2002: 31￿33).
However, the Fund￿s intensive bilateral surveil-
lance of developing countries￿ policies has not been
effective in crisis prevention in large part because it
has failed to diagnose and act on the root causes of
the problem. Indeed, according to an independent
assessment of Fund surveillance, policy makers in-
terviewed had important reservations regarding the
quality of the Fund￿s analysis of capital account is-
sues (IMF/GIE, 1999: 13). Experience since the early
1990s shows that preventing unsustainable surges
in private capital inflows, currency appreciations and
trade deficits holds the key to preventing financial
crises in emerging markets. However, as recognized
by the IMF￿s Independent Evaluation Office (IEO),
there is a consensus that none of the standard policy
measures recommended by the Fund for this pur-
pose, including countercyclical monetary and fiscal
policy and exchange rate flexibility, is a panacea,
and each involves significant costs or otherwise
brings about other policy dilemmas (IMF/IEO,
2005: 60). Sterilization through issuing government
paper, raising reserve requirements or generating
fiscal surpluses runs up against a host of problems.
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courage short-term inflows by reducing perceived
currency risks, the floating regime, which has come
to be favoured by the Fund after recurrent crises in
emerging markets, does not provide a viable alterna-
tive. As shown by the post-Bretton Woods experience
of advanced industrial countries and the more recent
experience of several emerging market economies
floating does not prevent excessive inflows of capi-
tal, misalignments in exchange rates and unsustainable
trade deficits; nor does it always secure an orderly
currency and payments adjustment.40 Similarly, pru-
dential regulations can help contain the damage
caused by rapid exit of capital, but they are not al-
ways effective in checking the build-up of external
fragility even when countercyclical adjustments are
made to rules governing loan-loss provisions, capital
requirements, collateral valuation and other meas-
ures affecting conditions in credit and asset markets
in order to limit the cyclicality of the financial sys-
tem.
All these imply that direct measures of control
over capital inflows that go beyond prudential regu-
lations may become necessary to prevent build up
of financial fragility and vulnerability to external
shocks.41 Developing country governments have
generally been unwilling to slow down excessive
capital inflows using, instead, the opportunity to
pursue pro-cyclical fiscal policies. Taiwan Province
of China is a notable exception with effective re-
strictions over arbitrage flows which protected the
economy from the East Asian crisis in 1997￿1998.42
Again Chile and Colombia employed un-remunerated
reserve requirements in a counter-cyclical manner,
imposed at times of strong inflows in the 1990s and
phased out when capital dried up at the end of the
decade. This was a price-based, non-discriminative
measure which effectively taxed arbitrage inflows
with the implicit tax rate varying inversely with ma-
turity. These measures were effective in improving
the maturity profile of external borrowing but not in
checking aggregate capital inflows. The Fund has
been ambivalent even towards these market-based
measures, questioning their rationale and effective-
ness (IMF/IEO, 2005: 46, box 2.3). This is largely
because, as noted in an independent report on sur-
veillance, the Fund has generally been optimistic
regarding the sustainability of capital inflows to
emerging markets (IMF/GIE, 1999: 44, box 3.2). It
has been averse to temporary control measures even
when there were clear signs that surges in short-term
capital inflows were leading to persistent currency
appreciations and growing trade deficits, advocat-
ing, instead, fiscal tightening and greater exchange
rate flexibility (IMF/IEO, 2005: 8￿9 and 59, table 3.2).
The Fund has little leverage over policies in
emerging market economies enjoying surges in capi-
tal flows, since they rarely need the Fund at such
times of bliss. It cannot act as a rating agency and
issue strong public warnings about sustainability of
economic conditions in its member countries because
of their possible adverse financial consequences. But
it is also notable that the Fund refrains from request-
ing policy changes and effective capital account
measures to slowdown speculative capital inflows,
check sharp currency appreciations and growing
current account deficits even in countries with
standby agreements. This was certainly the case in the
1990s when it supported exchange-based stabilization
programmes relying on short-term capital inflows.
More recently Turkey has also been going through a
similar process of continued appreciation and grow-
ing current account deficits under a floating regime,
brought about, in large part, by a surge in arbitrage
flows encouraged by high interest rates. Although
its external conditions appear to be highly fragile
and unsustainable, the Fund has done little to check
this process; it has actually given a further momen-
tum by constantly praising the policies pursued under
its supervision.43 Ironically, the Fund also seems to
be aware of the risks and vulnerabilities created by
the current boom in capital inflows to emerging
markets; as noted, it has been simulating scenarios
for a group of ￿21 vulnerable emerging market coun-
tries￿ to predict the financial gap that could emerge
in the event of ￿financial drought and poor economic
conditions￿ (IMF, 2005c: 8).
According to the recent report by the IEO ￿the
IMF has learned over time on capital account issues￿
and ￿the new paradigm ￿ acknowledges the use-
fulness of capital controls under certain conditions,
particularly controls over inflows￿, but this not yet
reflected in policy advice because of ￿the lack of a
clear position by the institution￿ (IMF/IEO, 2005: 11).
The report goes on to make recommendations to
bring about greater clarity in policy advice and the
role of capital account issues in IMF surveillance,
but it is not clear if these would lead to the kind of
fundamental changes needed in the Fund￿s approach
to capital account regimes.
The Articles allow the Fund to request mem-
bers to exercise control on capital outflows and
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tional capital flows. The 1977 surveillance decision
mentions, among the developments that might indi-
cate the need for discussion with a member, the
behaviour of the exchange rate that appears to be
unrelated to underlying economic and financial con-
ditions including factors affecting competitiveness
and long-term capital movements while the 1995
amendment explicitly refers to ￿unsustainable flows
of private capital￿ as an event triggering such dis-
cussion. In other words surveillance should include
sustainability of a country￿s external balance sheet and
hence effective management of external liabilities.44
However, none of these give the Fund clear and
effective jurisdiction over capital account issues or
allow it to include capital account measures as
conditionality in its financial arrangements with a
member (IMF/IEO, 2005: 50). Despite that the Fund
has played an important role in promoting capital
account liberalization in developing countries. Af-
ter many years of turmoil in emerging markets, the
issue now faced is how to include capital account
measures to the arsenal of policy tools for effective
management of international capital flows. As al-
ready argued, restrictions over capital outflows
should become legitimate tools of policy in the con-
text of orderly debt workout procedures at times of
rapid exit of capital. In the same vein, guidelines for
IMF surveillance should specify circumstances in
which the Fund should actually recommend the im-
position or strengthening of capital controls over
inflows, and the Fund should be able to request ex-
ercise of control over inflows as well as outflows. It
should also develop new techniques and mechanisms
designed to separate, to the extent possible, capital
account from current account transactions, to dis-
tinguish among different types of capital flows from
the point of view of their sustainability and economic
impact, and to provide policy advice and technical
assistance to countries at times when such measures
are needed.
How far should IMF surveillance cover sub-
jects such as financial regulation and standards for
financial reporting and accounting? This is clearly a
delicate question involving not only technical com-
petence but also powers and responsibilities in ar-
eas where there already exist other multilateral
bodies. It is much more important for the Fund to
focus on the analysis of capital flows including their
nature and sustainability with a view to reducing the
likelihood of crises than on the observance of inter-
national standards in developing countries in order
to limit the damage that may be caused by their re-
versals, leaving these matters to institutions with the
necessary expertise. This was indeed one of the rec-
ommendations of the report by independent experts
on surveillance (IMF/IGE, 1999: 15).
The failure of IMF surveillance in preventing
international financial crises also reflects the unbal-
anced nature of the procedures which give too little
recognition to shortcomings in the institutions and
policies in major industrial countries with large im-
pact on global economic conditions. For its borrowers
the policy advice given by the IMF in Article IV
consultations often provide the framework for the
conditionality to be attached to any future Fund pro-
gramme (IMF/GIE, 1999: 20), while its surveillance
of the policies of the most important players in the
global system has lost any real meaning with the
graduation of the industrial countries from the Fund
and the breakdown of the Bretton Woods arrangements
for exchange rates. This asymmetry in surveillance
between the creditors and debtors of the Fund has
increased further after recurrent emerging market
crises throughout the 1990s. Standards and codes
have been designed primarily to discipline debtor
developing countries on the presumption that the
cause of crises rests primarily with policy and insti-
tutional weaknesses in these countries. By contrast
very little attention has been given to the role played
by policies and institutions in major industrial coun-
tries in triggering international financial crises. For
instance while it is widely recognized that non-com-
pliance with standards and codes is a global problem,
the incentive structure for compliance is highly in-
effectual for the developed country members of the
Fund (Schneider and Silva, 2002: 4). Again, the Fund
has paid very little attention to how instability of
capital flows on the supply side could be reduced
through regulatory measures targeted at institutional
investors in major industrial countries (IMF/IEO,
2005: 7), or how transparency could be increased
for institutions engaged in destabilizing financial
transactions such as the hedge funds.
IMF multilateral surveillance has not paid ad-
equate attention to systemic interrelation among
countries ￿ an area of improvement identified by a
former Managing Director.45 More importantly, the
modalities of IMF surveillance do not include ways
of responding to and dealing with unidirectional
impulses emanating from changes in the monetary
and exchange-rate policies of the United States and
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cles in capital flows to developing countries and
major international financial crises are typically con-
nected to large shifts in macroeconomic and financial
conditions in the major industrial countries. The
sharp rise in the United States interest rates and the
appreciation of the dollar was a main factor in the
debt crisis of the 1980s. Likewise, the boom-bust
cycle of capital flows in the 1990s which devastated
many countries in Latin America and East Asia were
strongly influenced by shifts in monetary conditions
in the United States and the exchange rates among
the major reserve currencies (UNCTAD, 1998, Part
Two, chap. IV; and 2003, chap. II). Again much of
the current surge in capital flows to emerging mar-
kets is driven by financial market conditions in
industrial countries, including historically low in-
terest rates and ample liquidity, rather than by
fundamentals in recipient countries, and a reversal
of these conditions could trigger serious instability
in several emerging markets.
It has often been argued that the problems re-
garding the quality, effectiveness and evenhandedness
of surveillance could be addressed by overhauling
and downsizing the Board to make it more repre-
sentative and effective, and giving greater independ-
ence to Executive Directors vis-￿-vis their capitals
and to the IMF secretariat vis-￿-vis its governing
bodies.46 This view has been taken further by a sen-
ior British Treasury official who argued in favour of
a formal separation of surveillance from decisions
about programme lending and the use of IMF re-
sources so as to establish the Fund as independent
from political influence in its surveillance of econo-
mies as an independent central bank is in the opera-
tion of monetary policy (Balls, 2003). It is argued
that the current structure of the IMF treats pro-
gramme design as an extension of surveillance, but
the lack of a clear distinction between lending and
surveillance activities creates the wrong incentives
and diminishes the effectiveness of surveillance.
Moreover, there is currently no formal regular
mechanism for assessing whether the Fund is pro-
viding objective, rigorous, and consistent standards
of surveillance across all member countries ￿ pro-
gramme and non-programme countries. While re-
sponsible for ensuring the effectiveness of the Fund￿s
activities, Executive Directors also have responsi-
bilities to their authorities. This creates a conflict of
interest where Executive Directors tend to collude
in surveillance in defence of the countries they rep-
resent, turning peer pressure into peer protection.
Surveillance should thus rest with authorities who
are independent of their governments and who are
not involved in lending decisions, making it impar-
tial, legitimate, authoritative, transparent and ac-
countable. This would also have the advantage of
protecting the Board and IMF management from
being dragged into decisions, which ￿ on the basis
of objective evidence ￿ they would not want to take
or publicly justify.
Such a step could indeed help improve the
quality of surveillance for both programme and non-
programme countries in identifying risks and fra-
gilities and the policy measures needed. However,
it is not clear if it could really secure evenhanded-
ness between programme and non-programme coun-
tries. For programme countries, it would not be
possible to delink lending decisions from surveil-
lance. Indeed, if the proposed arrangements are to
improve the quality, authority and credibility, results
of surveillance should provide a sound and legiti-
mate basis for lending decisions by the Board. But
for non-programme countries there would be no such
mechanism to encourage governments to heed the
policy advice emerging from the surveillance proc-
ess. Publication of surveillance reports and a wider
debate over policy could help prevent build up of
fragilities and vulnerabilities by providing signals
to market participants and creating public pressure
on governments in need of corrective action, but even
an independent body responsible for surveillance
cannot be expected to issue public warnings since
they can become self-fulfilling prophecies. For G-1
or G-3 countries whose policies set the terms and
conditions in global financial markets, even such
warnings may be of little use in encouraging policy
reorientation or coordination.
Therefore, while independent surveillance may
improve its quality, credibility and impact for non-
programme countries, it cannot be relied on for
bringing greater symmetry between creditor and
debtor countries. Such a step may need to be sup-
plemented by reforms in many areas of governance
to be taken up in the following section. However,
given the limits to improving significantly the lev-
erage of the Fund over non-borrowing countries,
evenhandedness may only be possible by minimiz-
ing conditionality for programme countries and
increasing the degree of automaticity of their access
to the Fund in the ways discussed above.19 Reforming the IMF: Back to the Drawing Board
H.Governance: making the Fund a
genuinely multilateral institution
The debate over governance of the IMF has
focused mainly on issues raised by exercise of power
by its major shareholders, particularly the United
States. The most frequently debated areas of reform
include the procedures for the choice of the Manag-
ing Director and, more importantly, the distribution
of voting rights. Shortcomings in transparency and
accountability are also closely related to ￿democratic
deficit￿ within the governance structure of the Fund
resulting from the quota regime.
The postwar bargain struck between the United
States and Western Europe for the distribution of the
heads of the Bretton Woods institutions between the
two shores of the Atlantic has survived widespread
public criticism and initiatives taken by developing
countries. The latest selection of the Managing Di-
rector was again business as usual despite the
apparent consensus reached during the previous
round by the Board that the decision for selection
would be based on a wide and open discussion in-
volving all members of the Fund.47
There is a consensus among independent ob-
servers that the present distribution of voting rights
lacks legitimacy not only because it does not meet
the minimum standards for equity due to erosion of
￿basic votes￿, but also because it no longer reflects
the relative economic importance of the members
of the Fund.48 The existing distribution of voting
rights, together with the special majority require-
ments for key decisions, effectively gives a veto
power to the United States in matters such as adjust-
ment of quotas, the sale of IMF gold reserves,
balance of payments assistance to developing coun-
tries, and allocation of SDRs. Such a degree of
control by the United States may have had some ra-
tionale during the immediate postwar years when it
was the single most important creditor to the rest of
the world and effectively the only creditor of the
Fund. However, now not only is the United States
the single largest debtor country in the world, but it
is only one of the 45 creditor countries at the IMF.49
In theory the Fund appears to be a consensus
builder since decisions by the Board are taken with-
out formal voting.50 But there has been hardly any
consensus on proposals for change favoured by de-
veloping countries in areas such as quotas, voting
rights or SDR allocation. In reality the consensual
process of decision-making on the Executive Board
does not constitute a democratizing feature of Fund
governance, but a way of exerting pressure on dis-
senting countries to go along with its major share-
holders. The influence of developing countries is
further weakened by the practice of arriving at deci-
sions through consensus among Executive Directors,
rather than direct exercise of voting rights by each
and every member, since many developing countries
are represented by Executive Directors from indus-
trial countries.51
The procedures followed for the preparation
and approval of country programmes also diminish
the impact of developing countries. Typically agree-
ment is reached between the country concerned and
the Fund staff before a programme is presented to
the Board, and it is not always clear to what extent
the agreement reached reflects what the country re-
ally wants to do as opposed to what it has been
compelled to accept. This tends to discourage de-
veloping country Executive Directors to oppose
potentially damaging stabilization and adjustment
programmes even though in theory they have col-
lectively the required number of votes to block them.
Clearly an alternative procedure allowing the coun-
try concerned to make a presentation to the Board
about its policy intentions and to back it up, when
needed, with expert witnesses before entering into
any discussion with the management could provide
for a broader debate over country programmes and
greater say for developing countries in the Board.
The current distribution of voting rights and the
manner in which they are exercised effectively en-
able the major industrial countries to use the Fund
as a multilateral seal of approval to legitimize deci-
sions already taken elsewhere by this small number
of countries. Lack of broad participation in the de-
cision-making process is also a main reason why the
Fund does not meet the minimum standards of trans-
parency or accountability. There is an increased
agreement that despite certain measures recently
taken, lack of transparency goes well beyond that
justified by the confidential nature of the issues dealt
with by the Fund. The record on accountability is
even less encouraging: the Fund is protected against
bearing the consequences of the decisions taken, and
the burden of inappropriate policy choices invari-
ably falls on countries following its advice.20 G-24 Discussion Paper Series, No. 38
The proposals for reform for reducing the
democratic deficit fall into two categories. First,
changes could be made to special majority require-
ments in order to remove the veto power of the
Fund￿s major shareholders over key decisions. Sec-
ond, and more importantly, voting rights could be
reallocated so as to increase the voice of developing
countries. This could be done by increasing the share
of the basic votes in total voting rights and/or by
reallocating quotas on the basis of PPP. The main
loser would be the European Union, which collec-
tively holds almost twice as many votes as the United
States, far above the level justified by the share of
the region in the world economy. According to a
proposal for restoring basic votes to its original share
of around 11 per cent of total votes and allocating
quota-based votes on the basis of PPP, the share of
industrial countries would fall from over 62 per cent
to 51 per cent while that of developing countries
would rise from around 30 per cent to 42 per cent
(Kelkar, Yadav and Chaudhry, 2004, appendix 1).
There can be little doubt that a reform along
these lines would constitute an important step in
improving the Fund￿s governance. It would rectify
anomalies such as Canada holding the same number
of votes as China or smaller European countries in-
cluding Belgium and the Netherlands holding more
votes than India, Brazil or Mexico, making the Fund
look a more participatory and democratic institution.
Nevertheless, it is unlikely to make a significant
impact on the political leverage of its major share-
holders or reduce the imbalance between its creditor
and debtors.
The problems of governance and lack of uni-
formity of treatment across members cannot be re-
solved as long as Fund resources depend on the
discretion of a small number of its shareholders.
Reserve currency countries are the principal credi-
tors to the Fund and their quota subscription pay-
ments provide the only usable international assets
since there is no demand for national currencies paid
in by developing countries. Moreover, the Fund bor-
rows not from international financial markets, but
from a minority of its members under two standing
arrangements, GAB and NAB. It is true that the dis-
tinction between creditor and debtor countries is not
the same as that between industrial and developing
countries, and at the end of 2004 of the 45 creditor
countries to the Fund 9 were developing countries.
However, unlike industrial countries, developing
countries￿ net financial position in the Fund has been
highly volatile. Almost all of the 44 countries which
have switched, at least once, over 1980￿2004 be-
tween being net financial contributors to the Fund
and being debtors, and back, are developing coun-
tries (Boughton, 2005: 4). With increased frequency
of financial crises in emerging markets, this classi-
fication, like international credit ratings, has become
highly unstable. For instance the Republic of Ko-
rea, Malaysia, Mexico and Thailand now are among
the creditors of the IMF while they were heavily
indebted a few years ago. Again there is no guaran-
tee that countries such as Chile and China which
have been IMF creditors for some time will remain
so in the years ahead.52
In trade, bilateralism is often seen as a threat to
multilateralism because of the preferential treatment
it accords to some countries at the expense of the
others in violation of the MFN principle, and the
role played by political considerations in bilateral
and regional trade arrangements. In the sphere of
finance, by contrast, bilateral and multilateral ar-
rangements are often seen as complementary. As
already noted, in several instances the Fund￿s inter-
ventions in emerging market crises were combined
with bilateral contributions from major industrial
countries, notably but not solely the United States,
particularly where political, economic and military
interests were involved. Again, official debt reduc-
tion initiatives combine bilateral and multilateral
debt, as in HIPC, and bilateral lenders often insist
that any talks in the Paris club should be preceded
by a formal IMF programme. Since bilateral lend-
ing is driven largely by political considerations
(Gilbert, Powell and Vines, 1999; Kapur and Webb,
1994; and Rodrik, 1995) and bilateral debt negotia-
tions rarely satisfy uniformity of treatment of debtors,
such arrangements serve to subvert the governance
of the Fund further, thereby enhancing the scope to
make it an instrument for major industrial countries
to pursue their national interests.
A reform that would translate the Fund into a
truly multilateral institution responsible for interna-
tional monetary and financial stability with equal
rights and obligations of all its members, de facto as
well as de jure, would call for, inter alia, an interna-
tional agreement on sources of finance that do not
depend on the discretion of a handful of countries as
well as a clear separation of multilateral financial
arrangements from bilateral creditor-debtor relations.
The potential sources of genuinely multilateral fi-
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reached on international taxes, including the currency
transaction tax (the so-called Tobin tax), environ-
mental taxes and various other taxes such as those
on arms trade, to be applied by all parties to the agree-
ment on the transactions and activities concerned
(Atkinson, 2003; Wahl, 2005). A common feature
of these is that they are all sin taxes which would
provide revenues while discouraging certain global
public bads such as currency speculation, environ-
mental damage or armed conflict and violence.
However, these sources of revenue are more appro-
priate for development grants to poorest countries
or for the provision of global public goods rather
than provision of liquidity for temporary payments
imbalances.
A more appropriate source of funding for the
provision of international liquidity is the SDR. Un-
der present arrangements the IMF may allocate SDRs
to members in proportion to their quotas, but not to
itself. Members obtain or use SDRs through volun-
tary exchanges or by the Fund designating members
with strong external positions to purchase SDRs from
members with weak external position. When mem-
bers￿ holdings rise above or fall below their allocation
they earn or pay interest respectively. These arrange-
ments would need to be changed to allow the SDR
to replace quotas and GAB and NAB as the source
of funding for the IMF. The Fund should be allowed
to issue SDR to itself up to a certain limit which
should increase over time with growth in world trade.
The SDR could become a universally accepted
means of payments, held privately as well as by pub-
lic institutions. Countries￿ access would be subject
to predetermined limits which should also grow over
time with world trade. The demand for SDRs can be
expected to be inversely related to buoyancy in glo-
bal trade and production and the availability of
private financing for external payments. Thus, it
would help counter deflationary forces in the world
economy and provide an offset to fluctuations in
private balance of payments financing.
Several issues of detail would still need to be
worked out, but once an agreement is reached to re-
place traditional sources of funding with the SDR,
the IMF could in fact be translated into a techno-
cratic institution of the kind advocated by Keynes
during the Bretton Woods negotiations.53 Its fund-
ing would no longer be subjected to arduous and
politically charged negotiations dominated by ma-
jor industrial countries. The case for creating SDRs
to provide funding for the IMF for current account
financing is much stronger than the case for using
them to back up financial bailouts associated with a
potential lender of last resort function advocated by
some observers (e.g. Fischer, 1999) in so far as it
could help improve the governance of the Fund and
reduce the imbalance between its creditors and debt-
ors. Such a step, if supplemented by the kind of
reforms regarding its mandate, operational modalities
and governance structure discussed earlier, would
give the Fund a chance to operate as an institution
for all countries, rather than as an instrument of some.
I.Summary and conclusions
A genuine reform of the international financial
system generally and the Fund particularly depends
on developing countries forming a coherent view on
a broad range of issues which, in turn, calls for
greater understanding of various options as well as
extensive deliberations and consultations. This pa-
per aims at contributing to this process. A main
conclusion that emerges from the discussions above
is that the original rationale of the Fund, namely to
safeguard international monetary and financial sta-
bility, is now even stronger than in the immediate
postwar era given the size and speed of international
capital flows and their capacity to inflict damage on
the real economy. Thus the Fund needs to go back
to its core objectives and focus on preventing mar-
ket and policy failures in order to attain greater
international economic stability and facilitate expan-
sion of employment, trade and income. Realization
of this objective calls for reforms on several fronts:
￿The Fund needs a greater focus. It should stay
out of development finance and policy and pov-
erty alleviation. This is an unjustified diversion
and an area that belongs to multilateral devel-
opment banks. All facilities created for this
purpose should be transferred to the World Bank
as the Fund terminates its activities in devel-
opment and long-term lending.
￿A major task of the Fund is to promote a stable
system of exchange rates and payments to en-
sure a predictable trading environment. In this
task the Fund should focus on macroeconomic
and exchange rate policies and stay away from
trade policies. The attempts by the Fund to pro-
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countries drawing on its resources undermine
the bargaining power of these countries in mul-
tilateral trade negotiations.
￿Crisis management and resolution is an increas-
ingly important area of responsibility of the Fund.
However, the Fund should not be allowed to
bail out lenders and investors since such op-
erations prevent market discipline and create
lenders￿ moral hazard. Accordingly, there
should be strict limits to the Fund￿s crisis lend-
ing. Instead, the Fund should help develop or-
derly workout mechanisms for sovereign debt
both to prevent financial meltdown and to
restructure debt which cannot be serviced ac-
cording to its original terms and conditions.
Temporary debt standstills and exchange
restrictions should thus become legitimate ingre-
dients of multilateral financial arrangements.
￿The Fund should focus on lending to finance
temporary current account imbalances result-
ing from external trade and financial shocks as
well as from domestic policy imbalances. There
should be greater automaticity in meeting
payments imbalances resulting from external
shocks and less emphasis on policy adjustment.
Conditionality should not be extended to struc-
tural issues but confined to macroeconomic and
exchange rate policies.
￿The Fund￿s resources need to be increased to
keep up with growth in international trade.
Access of countries to Fund resources should
be based on the principle of need, not on coun-
tries￿ contribution to the Fund or their relative
importance in the world economy.
￿Fund surveillance has been ineffective in pre-
venting emerging market crises. While the
primary responsibility for avoiding crises lies
with individual countries￿ own policy choices,
the Fund has contributed to increased vulner-
ability and fragility of emerging markets by
promoting premature capital account liberali-
zation and failing to alert countries against
unsustainable surges in capital inflows, currency
appreciations and current account imbalances.
Progress on this front depends on a fundamen-
tal change in the approach of the Fund to capital
market issues. The Fund should improve its
ability to identify risks and fragilities, and de-
velop policy tools to prevent unsustainable
capital flows to emerging markets, including
direct and indirect control mechanisms, and
provide policy advice.
￿The Fund surveillance has also been unable to
prevent destabilizing impulses originating from
persistent trade imbalances and exchange rate
misalignments in major industrial countries.
This too is partly due to the poor quality of
policy analysis and assessment of market con-
ditions. Separating surveillance from lending
decisions and assigning it to an authority inde-
pendent of the Board could improve its quality,
legitimacy and impact. However, such a reform
alone is unlikely to increase significantly the
leverage of the Fund over non-programme
countries and eliminate the imbalance between
the Fund￿s debtors and creditors.
￿Any reform designed to bring greater author-
ity and legitimacy would need to address short-
comings in the Fund￿s governance in several
areas including the selection of its head, the
distribution of voting rights, transparency and
accountability. However the Fund is unlikely
to become a genuinely multilateral institution
with equal rights and obligations for all its
members, in practice as well as in theory, as
long as it depends for resources on a handful
of industrial countries and its financial activi-
ties are intimately linked to bilateral debtor-
creditor relations between donor and recipients.
These problems could be overcome if the IMF
ceases to be an institution funded by its mem-
bers, and relies on SDRs for the resources
needed.
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10 See Aky￿z and Flassbeck (2002: 98). The last standby
agreements with industrial countries were with Italy and
the United Kingdom in 1977 and Spain in 1978; see Fi-
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Haldane (1999), Aky￿z (2002) and Eichengreen (2002).
28 A proposal to apply bankruptcy principles was made by
UNCTAD (1986, annex to chap. VI) during the debt cri-
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(2001).
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(2001), BIS (2001, chap. VII) and Aky￿z (2004).
42 Because of such regulations Taiwan Province of China has
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(2005: 3).
43 In a recent study of vulnerability of emerging markets to
adverse global financial conditions, potential exchange
rate problems and fiscal and monetary policy challenges,
Turkey heads the list; see Goldstein (2005b, particularly
table 11). On external financial fragility of the Turkish
economy see also UNECE (2005, chap. 4).
44 Indeed management of external liabilities was a key part
of the report of the Financial Stability Forum on capital
flows. For a discussion see Cornford (2000).
45 See remarks by Camdessus on ￿How Should the IMF be
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46 For a discussion of these issues see Cottarelli (2005);
van Houtven (2004); Kelkar, Chaudhry and Vanduzer-
Snow (2005); and Kelkar, Chaudhry, Vanduzer-Snow and
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by the three former Managing Directors of the Fund, De
LarosiŁre, Camdessus and K￿hler; see ￿How Should the
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ber 2004: 27￿29.
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